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SPEECH
Constitutional Protections in FBI
Investigations*
By WILLIAM SESSIONS**
I was interested to learn that, at the age of twenty-seven, Henry
Clay held the Professorship of Law and Politics in the earliest
beginnings of this great University That was in 1805-over one
hundred years before the formal founding of your College of Law
Henry Clay would probably be astonished to see how national
issues and legal issues have changed; indeed, he would probably
be stunned to see how the world itself has changed in the interven-
ing years. But I think he would have been very comfortable with
the subject of my lecture this evening. Throughout his long and
distinguished career, he stood as strongly for law-and for law and
order-as he did for the rights of each and every American.
In fact, in those early days of democracy, he, perhaps above
all others, saw that the future of the nation depended on its ability
to maintain a reasonable balance between individual liberties and
social order. It was that insistence on balance that led him to
middle ground, and he occupied that ground as "the great com-
promiser."
My subject this evening concerns this "reasonable balance be-
tween individual liberties and social order" as it works out in
practical terms. In other words, how can our nation maintain social
order on its streets and in its marketplaces-and at the same time
protect the right of its citizens to be left alone?
Often it is crime that tests the balance between these two
conflicting concerns. Criminal acts force us to evaluate and make
decisions about how safe we want and need to be-and at what
cost to the way we freely go about our own individual business.
* The Sixth Bienmal Roy and Virginia Ray Lecture of the Umversity of Kentucky
College of Law, October 17, 1989.
** Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; former U.S. District Judge for the
Western Distnct of Texas. B.A. 1956, Baylor University; J.D. 1958, Baylor Law School.
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As an example, think about the terrorist bombing of Pan Am
flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December, 1988. Pan Am
103 reaffirmed the necessity of enduring the intrusiveness of strict
airport security measures in order to protect ourselves, our airways,
and our citizens-both at home and abroad.
My point is that the FBI plays a strong and continuing role in
efforts to keep our society safe and free. In order to fulfill this
critical mission, the FBI has, within strict attorney general guide-
lines, been given the authority to use some intrusive techniques to
investigate certain kinds of crime. The fact is, in many cases,
sensitive investigative techniques like the use of informants, court-
authorized surveillances, and undercover agents are the only way
that the FBI can penetrate terrorist and drug-trafficking organiza-
tions that threaten our national security; that we can gather evi-
dence of fraud in our free markets and in our financial institutions;
and that public corruption can be detected within the government-
corruption that insidiously undermines our institutions and betrays
the public trust.
At the same time, because this kind of evidence-gathering can
encroach on our citizens' expectation of privacy, we must be scru-
pulously careful to minimize intrusions that might impact on civil
liberties. Obviously, this is often a very delicate balance to main-
tain.
I would like to address these constitutional concerns with you
this evening and describe the FBI's use of sensitive investigative
techniques. I will discuss how the FBI manages these techniques
and procedures in a fair and lawful manner, and give you some
examples of how the FBI uses these techniques to bring virtually
undetectable crime to light.
Let us start with a brief review of the time-tested investigative
technique of electronic surveillance. The object of electronic sur-
veillance, of course, is to unearth and record criminal activity, that
might otherwise go undetected, for use as courtroom evidence of
exactly what transpired.
Needless to say, any electronic surveillance is also very intru-
sive-and for this reason, it is used only in strict compliance with
the Constitution, applicable federal statutes, and FBI and strict
Department of Justice controls and procedures. By the strict ob-
servance of these requirements, we can assure the constitutional
"right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Wiretapping, which is probably the most frequently used intru-
sive surveillance, has been the subject of constitutional challenges
for over sixty years. In the 1928 case Olmstead v. United States,2
the Supreme Court ruled that wiretapping was not contrary to the
U.S. Constitution because there was no physical trespass and no
search or seizure of physical belongings.
Today, as a result of a 1967 Supreme Court decision in Katz
v. United States,3 wiretapping is classified as a "search," ' 4 and its
use is permitted only under the most careful procedural safeguards,
set out in Title III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Secrets Act. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
was enacted to extend protection from electronic surveillance to
voice and data digital communications, electronic mail and mes-
saging services, and cellular phones, thus expanding Title III pro-
tections.
I think you will be interested in learning how the FBI governs
the use of this technique. Long before we send a Title III electronic
surveillance application to a reviewing judge, we rigorously review
it ourselves. First, in the application, we describe fully the mini-
mization procedures we employ to prevent the accumulation of
information that has no relationship to crime. These procedures
include not overhearing a conversation that is unrelated to crime
or where the attorney-client privilege might be involved. Thus, the
procedure is designed to protect the public from indiscriminate
listening.
Next, we initiate an approval process that begins in the field
office when a case agent prepares the affidavit in support of an
application for a Title III electronic surveillance. Thereafter, the
application must pass through rigorous reviews at several levels.
After reviews at the local level, it is sent to FBI headquarters in
Washington, where it is examined by our legal counsel division,
our criminal investigative division, and attorneys at the Department
of Justice. It is then referred to the attorney general, or his des-
ignate, for authority to file it in federal court. Finally, the appli-
cation is submitted to a U.S. district court judge by the appropriate
U.S. attorney's office. I should also mention that when the appli-
cation involves particularly sensitive circumstances, I personally
review and approve it.
2 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 353.
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In the application to the reviewing judge, even though not
constitutionally required, we go one step further by advising the
court every time we make a surreptitious entry to install a device.
We ask the court to include the authority for such an entry in the
court's order. Though these steps are not required by law, their
inclusion in the process confirms our great caution and concern
for fairness.
A brief review of a few cases will illustrate the FBI's careful
use of court-authorized electronic surveillance. Perhaps some of
you have heard of the case known as Illwind, "the defense pro-
curement scandal," a case where government bidding regulations
were allegedly being circumvented but without leaving a trace of
evidence. No documents described the fraud; no notes signalled
bribery attempts. The bribes were offered and the deals were sealed
only with spoken words-and these words would have evaporated
into the air if they had not been captured by court-authorized
wiretaps.
This two-year investigation, conducted jointly by the FBI and
the Naval Investigative Service, made extensive use of electronic
surveillances. By recording conversations that demonstrated im-
proper dealings among consultants, some defense contractors, and
certain government officials, we were able to shine a light into
dark corners of fraud that cannot-and will not-be tolerated in
our government. To date, twenty-seven individuals have been con-
victed.
Another FBI case involving a Puerto Rican terrorist group has
had far-reaching consequences. In the course of our investigation,
we actually videotaped the terrorists as they busily constructed
deadly bombs. The terrorists were indignant when they saw the
film, and they protested that we had violated their privacy rights!
Ultimately, the information we gathered with our court-authorized
closed-circuit TV surveillance was upheld in court as proper and
legally obtained evidentiary material that would be admissible in a
trial. Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
against the terrorists' claim of violated rights, saying, "there is no
right to be let alone while assembling bombs in safe houses." 5
Through this process, our nation is best able to define-and re-
define-the critical democratic balance.
Let us turn now to the FBI's use of informants to gather
evidence of crime. This technique was upheld in 1966 in Hoffa v.
United States v, Alejandrina Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 883 (7th Cir. 1984).
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United States,6 when the Supreme Court ruled that "the petitioner,
in a word, was not relying on the security of the hotel room [when
he divulged criminal information]; he was relying upon his mis-
placed confidence that Partin [the informant] would not reveal his
wrongdoing." ' 7 This ruling affirmed that when you take someone
into your confidence, you are assuming the risk that your conver-
sation will be revealed. Therefore, no violation of the fourth
amendment has occurred.
The use of informants has often been called the single most
important tool in law enforcement. Even a cursory review will
show why. Where can an investigation begin when a crime has
been committed and there are no fingerprints, no evidence, no
identified crime scene, and no eyewitnesses? Where do you turn?
You look for informants, i.e., people who are in a position to
provide information about the wrongdoing involved in that partic-
ular circumstance.
The FBI uses an astonishing variety of informants and coop-
erating witnesses. At one end of the spectrum may be someone
deeply involved in crime like Philip LaRosa. Philip LaRosa was a
counterfeiter who offered to be an informant for us as part of a
plea agreement. Born in Sicily to a family with ties to La Cosa
Nostra, LaRosa has deep knowledge of organized crime, and he
has used that knowledge to assist us with some of our most
comprehensive investigations. Following his work for us as an
informant, he agreed to become a cooperating witness and to testify
publicly. Most recently, his testimony has provided the linchpin
for our "Buffalo Sicilian Connection" case-a heroin-trafficking
case that began in Buffalo and led us, through the Mafia network,
to Philadelphia, Baltimore, Miami, Newark, New York, San Fran-
cisco, Rockford, Illinois, and nine Italian cities. Thanks to Philip
LaRosa's work, sixty-four top leaders were arrested in the United
States, and twenty top leaders were arrested in Italy.
At the other end of the spectrum are the good citizens: those
with reputations for honesty and fairness who give us information
out of a laudable sense of duty. Terrence Hake is such a person.
Terry Hake was a young assistant state's attorney in Chicago who
was so disgusted with the corruption he had observed in the Cook
County judicial system that he was seriously considering leaving
the practice of law.
6 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
Id. at 302 (footnote omitted).
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We approached Terry and asked him to help us. We told him
that we could not give him promises or guarantees of a secure
future. We told him that his cooperation might well jeopardize
personal and professional friendships-and might well destroy his
reputation and a promising legal career in Chicago.
But Terry Hake said "yes"-he would not only help gather
evidence, he would also testify in court. He wore a wire for three-
and-one-half years-first pretending to be a corrupt prosecutor in
a narcotics court, then to be a corrupt defense lawyer who became
adept at fixing cases. As a result of his work, the FBI was able to
prove systemic corruption in the largest big-city judicial system in
the nation. Thanks to Terry, "Operation Greylord," as it is known,
has been responsible for the conviction of thirteen county judges,
forty-six lawyers, eight policemen, ten deputy sheriffs, and four
court clerks-all individuals who betrayed the public trust for
paltry amounts of money. To my mind, Terry Hake is a man who
has set the highest possible standard of ethical conviction and
dedicated action in the legal profession.
I would like to add that just two days ago, in Orlando, Florida,
I presented Terry Hake with the highest award given by the Society
of Former Special Agents: the Louis E. Peters Memorial Service
Award. Watching Terry receive the award, I could not help but
ask myself whether I as a lawyer would be willing to go through
the five years he underwent-whether I would be willing to risk
my own reputation, my own cherished standing in the legal com-
munity. The award commemorated to me the great significance of
Terry Hake's undertaking, because here was a man willing to risk
it all with no assurances that his work would succeed, and with
the understanding that his personal safety would be in jeopardy.
Philip LaRosa and Terry Hake-and all the variously motivated
informants in between-are essential and critical to our work be-
cause they provide inside information on criminal activity-and
because they are often our only means of putting our undercover
agents in contact with criminal organizations. At the same time,
we are very careful that our management of informants is fair and
beyond reproach. We safeguard our informants by protecting their
confidentiality. But, because many are capable of working both
sides of the street, we protect ourselves and the public by super-
vising them very closely. We keep records of what they have been
instructed to do; what they have done; what they have been paid;
and what they have produced. We are always ready to be held
accountable.
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The FBI functions under strict attorney general guidelines and
FBI regulations that specifically spell out our day-to-day respon-
sibilities in using informants. If agents discover an informant is
involved in criminal activity, they must deal with it and report it
to their supervisor immediately. I want to emphasize that inform-
ants are not used by the FBI to circumvent legal or ethical restric-
tions. They are given specific instructions not to participate in acts
of violence, not to use unlawful techniques to get information, and
not to commit criminal acts. If they violate our rules, they will be
subject to prosecution.
Let me turn now to our third sensitive investigative technique:
the undercover agent. Our agents have been often glamorized, and
they have also been criticized, depending on one's perspective. But
to those of us in law enforcement who see wrongs that need to be
corrected, these agents are invaluable and necessary instruments of
justice.
In major criminal investigations, undercover agents have dis-
cipline, control, and staying power. We have trained them to
understand and respect the law's requirements; we can trust them
implicitly to carry out their demanding responsibilities over a long
investigation; and we can count on their credibility on the witness
stand. It is an unbeatable combination-and one that is fully
sanctioned by the courts.
Just in the past year, we have dismantled several heroin-traf-
ficking organizations-including the one where Philip LaRosa acted
as our informant-by setting up a bogus food import business that
offered to serve as a conduit for drugs. In Florida, we dismantled
seven Colombian cocaine-trafficking organizations that used our
undercover agents as communications experts-they bought beep-
ers, cellular phones, and short-wave radios from us, and they hired
us to electronically sweep their boats and homes for wiretaps. In
yet another three-year undercover operation, agents posed as money-
launderers and were able to work their way into the inner sanctum
of Colombian money-laundering syndicates-and finally to arrest
the leadership as well as seize their assets. The investigation, thus
far, has resulted in 114 indictments, and the seizure of $22.5 million
in cash, 2,100 pounds of cocaine, 22,000 pounds of marijuana,
fifty-four automobiles, expensive residences, and $1 million in
other assets.
The length, complexity, and sensitive nature of undercover
projects, however, all call for extremely careful and comprehensive
planning and control. Indeed, the procedure for requesting such
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an operation is formidable. Each project originates in a field office
as a "scenario." Then, it goes up the approval chain-first locally,
then in Washington through a "substantive desk" and the under-
cover and sensitive operations unit. Thereafter, it is tested by the
criminal undercover operations review committee.
If the proposal is approved by this last committee, it is given
to the head of our criminal investigative division, or, in particularly
sensitive circumstances, to me for final approval. No operation is
approved for more than six months, and extensions are granted
only after committee review.
Once in place, we monitor undercover operations closely to
ensure fairness and full compliance with legal requirements and
the attorney general's guidelines. Our recent investigation of com-
modities fraud in Chicago is a perfect example of this kind of
operation.
For many years, there has been concern about fraudulent prac-
tices in our nation's commodities exchanges-but commodities fraud
is difficult to detect and to trace among the labyrinths of the two-
and-one-half-trillion-dollar operation-and it is difficult to bring
to prosecution. Even to understand that a law has been broken,
you must understand completely the complex world of the com-
modities marketplace. How, then, could we even begin to initiate
an investigation?
It is public knowledge that we used extraordinary means to
detect extraordinary fraud. Two special agents of the FBI were
exhaustively trained in the specialized field of futures trading. They
appeared on the floors of the Chicago Board of Trade and the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange as runners and phone clerks, then
worked their way up the system until they bought their own seats
and traded in the pits.
Over time, they gathered evidence through surveillances of and
participation in illegal trades. Finally, on August 3, 1989, as a
result of the concerted effort of the FBI and the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission, the Department of Justice, and rep-
resentatives of the Internal Revenue Service and the Postal Inspec-
tion Service, forty-six traders were indicted on charges ranging
from defrauding customers to tax evasion. Following public disclo-
sure of the case, our agents interviewed over five hundred people,
served over five hundred subpoenas, and collected over one million
documents. Even more importantly, reforms are underway in the
commodities markets that will help prevent further systemic fraud
in our national marketplace.
[VOL. 78
FBI INVESTIGATIONS
In all the cases I have talked about tonight, I have tried to
show you how the FBI serves the ends of justice by strictly follow-
ing our statutes, guidelines, rules, and regulations; by striving for
fairness; and by seeking always to balance the concerns of liberty
and order. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson once observed
that "the choice is not between order and liberty. It is between
'liberty with order' and anarchy without either." 8 The Bill of
Rights was never meant to be a suicide pact. The protections it
affords must be rationally applied if we are to prevail against
criminals who seek to frustrate the very liberties our constitution
was designed to secure. The FBI's lawful, intrusive techniques can,
with proper management and oversight, maintain the social order
we must preserve without jeopardizing the individual freedoms of
our citizens.
I Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
1989-90]

